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Abstract
Inflation targeting is a common monetary policy regime. Inflation targets are often
flexible in the sense that the central bank allows inflation to temporarily deviate from
the target to avoid causing unnecessary volatility in the real economy. In this paper, we
propose modeling the degree of flexibility using an autoregressive fractionally inte-
grated moving average (ARFIMA) model. Assuming that the central bank controls
the long-run inflation rate, the fractional integration order becomes a measure of how
flexible the inflation target is. A higher integration order implies that inflation deviates
from the target for longer periods of time and consequently, that the target is flexi-
ble. Several estimators of the fractional integration order have been proposed in the
literature. Grassi and Magistris (2014) show that a state-based maximum likelihood
estimator is superior to other estimators, but our simulations show that their finding
is over-biased for a nearly non-stationary time series. To resolve this issue, we first
proposed a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) estimator for fractional
integration parameters. This estimator resolves the problem of over-bias. We estimate
the fractional integration order for 6 countries for the period 1993M1 to 2017M9. We
found that inflation was integrated to an order of 0.8 to 0.9 indicating that the inflation
targets are implemented with a high degree of flexibility.
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1 Introduction
Inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular monetary policy regime since
the early 1990s (Hammond 2012). Bank of Canada was the first central bank, in the
modern era, to shift to inflation targeting in 1991, and the Federal Reserve was one of
the last to do so in 2012. Although the Federal Reserve was late in adopting an official
inflation target, it had targeted the rate of inflation since at least the late 1970s, but
without having announced an official target rate. Its inflation target was in other words
implicit rather than explicit until 2012.
All inflation targeting central banks are faced with a dilemma. A strict focus on
inflation targeting may increase volatility elsewhere in the economy (Svensson 1997).
On the other had a too flexible approach to inflation targeting may undermine credi-
bility in the target. Most central banks have opted for policy strategy somewhere in the
middle between strict and flexible inflation targeting. In the long-run, the bank focuses
narrowly on inflation, while it takes other non-inflation considerations into account
over the short- to medium-rum. Or in the words of the former Governor of the Bank
of England, Mervyn King, central bankers are not ‘inflation nutters’. How the rest of
the economy develops also has an impact on the decisions of the central bank. In fact,
one reasons the Federal Reserve had an implicit rather than explicit inflation target
was to ensure that the bank had the flexibility to respond to non-inflationary events in
the economy (Lindsey et al. 2005).
Although there are benefits from having a flexible inflation target (for a discussion
see e.g. Woodford 2003; Kuttner and Posen 2012; Andersson and Jonung 2017) it
also raises a few questions. First, it becomes more difficult to hold the central bank
accountable when the target is flexible. Because inflation is allowed to deviate from
the target under a flexible regime, comparing the inflation outcome with the inflation
target is not necessarily a good indicator of the success of the central bank. Second,
for consumers, firms, and investors, it becomes more difficult to forecast the future
behavior of the central bank. A simple measure of how flexible the inflation target
policy is would help to solve some of the issues around a flexible policy. So far, no
such simple measure has been found.
In this paper, we propose that the fractional integration order from an autoregressive
fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model can serve as an estimate of
the degree of flexibility. Several studies have found that inflation is a highly persistent
series. In fact, several studies have failed to reject that inflation contains a unit root,
even in those cases inwhich the central bank has an inflation target and inflation clearly
fluctuates around a stationary long-run mean (Hassler and Wolters 1995; Caggiano
and Castelnuovo 2011). The results from those studies suggest that inflation is mean-
reverting, but a covariance non-stationary series, i.e., fractional integration with an
integration order between 0.5 and 1.Under the assumption that in the long-run inflation
is entirely caused by monetary policy, as is commonly assumed (see e.g. ECB 2004),
the fractional integration order represents the central bankers preferences. The higher
(lower) the fractional integration order is, the longer (shorter) are the deviations from
the mean (i.e., the target), and the more flexible (strict) is the inflation target policy.
Hence, by estimating the fractional integration order, we obtain a simple estimate of
the degree of flexibility.
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Several estimators of ARFIMA models have been proposed in the econometric
literature. These include the parametric method, which is based on the maximum
likelihood function (Fox and Taqqu 1986; Sowell 1992; Giraitis and Taqqu 1999) and
the regression-based approach in spectral domain (Geweke and Porter-Hudak 1983).
Additional estimators include the semi-parametric (Robinson 1995a, b; Shimotsu and
Phillips 2005) and the wavelet-based semi-parametric (McCoy and Walden 1996;
Jensen 2004) methods.
Chan and Palma (1998) established a theoretical foundation to estimate the
ARFIMA model with an approximate maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)-based
state space model. The authors truncated the infinite autoregressive (AR) or moving
average (MA) representations of the ARFIMA model into finite lags and calculated
the approximate maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter. Chan and Palma (1998)
show that the approximate MLE-based state space model has desirable asymptotic
properties and a rapid convergence rate. Recently, Grassi and Magistris (2014) con-
ducted a simulation study to compare the state space model-based long-memory
estimation with several widely applied parametric and semi-parametric methods.
Grassi and Magistris (2014) show that compared with the other estimations, the state
space model method is robust to the t distribution and missing value, measurement
error and level shift.
Chan and Palma (1998) and Grassi and Magistris (2014) consider the stationary
case with 0 < d < 0.4. While inflation likely has an integration order above 0.5, we
first propose aMetropolis–Hastings algorithm inMarkov chainMonte Carlo (MCMC)
to extend the possible range of integration orders to also include the non-stationary
case with d > 0.5. Simulation studies provided in the paper shows that the approach
works well even when the integration order is close to 1.
We then applied the algorithm to estimate the fractional integration order for seven
economies (Canada, Euro area, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) between 1993 and 2017 using monthly data. All countries have
central banks with inflation targets, although both Germany (1993–1997) and the
United States (1993–2012) had implicit rather than explicit inflation targets during
parts of the sample period. Our estimation results show that all central banks have
flexible targets and are no “inflation nutters”. The fractional integration order is high
and close to 0.9. The integration order tends to be higher for larger economies and
lower for smaller economies. There is no evidence of having an implicit rather than
explicit inflation target makes the target more flexible. The fractional integration order
appears to be unrelated to whether the target is explicit or implicit. Out results also
indicate that the inflation targets have becomemore flexible since the financial crisis of
2008/09. Financial stability and the economic crisis that followed have likely changed
the focus of central banks away from inflation targeting to other important variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 discusses inflation and
inflation targets. Section 3 introduces the state space model-based MLE for long-
memory series, Sect. 4 combines the state space model with the MCMC algorithm to
estimate the fractional difference parameters, Sect. 5 applies empirical examples, and
the conclusion can be found in Sect. 6.
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2 Inflation and Inflation Targets
2.1 Monetary Policy and Inflation Targets
There is a general consensus in the literature that in the long-run, inflation is caused by
the central bank’smonetary policy (ECB2004), or asMilton Friedman put it, “inflation
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (Friedman 1963). In the short-
run, however, there are other factors, such as energy prices, business cycles, shocks,
and crises that also affect inflation. Because inflation has no positive long-run effects
on the economy, limiting the rate of inflation has always been one of the key tasks for
the central bank (Goodhart 2011). How central banks work to achieve price stability
has changed over time. Implicit inflation targeting became popular in the late 1970s
and early 1980s with both the Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank setting
implicit inflation targets (Svensson 1998; Gerberding et al. 2004; Lindsey et al. 2005).
These targets were never publically announced, but central banks acted to stabilize
the inflation rate around its unofficial target. In the early 1990s a shift towards explicit
and publically announced inflation targets began with Canada in 1991, followed by
Sweden and the United Kingdom in 1993 (Hammond 2012).
The difference between an explicit and an implicit inflation target is whether the
central bank has publically committed to a specific inflation target. Either in terms
of a publically announced target rate or target range (Bernanke et al. 1999). There
are advantages and disadvantages with both the explicit and the implicit target. A
public commitment to a specific target may enhance the central banks credibility and
contribute to anchoring inflation expectations, which in turn helps the central bank
to reach its target (Blinder et al. 2008). On the other hand, commitment to a specific
target reduces the central banks flexibility to respond to non-inflation events in the
economy (Lindsey et al. 2005).
In the long-run, a narrow focus on inflation stability has positive welfare effects.
In the short-run, a strict inflation focus can reduce welfare for 2 main reasons: First,
to stabilize inflation, the central bank has to neutralize the effects of the economic
shocks that affect the rate of inflation. The central bank can only do so by increasing or
decreasing the interest rate. These changes in the interest rate affect not only inflation,
but also unemployment, economic growth, exchange rates, and financial markets. To
keep inflation stable, the central bank must constantly adjust the interest rate, which
makes the rest of the economy less stable. In other words, short-run inflation stability
comes at the expense of volatility elsewhere in the economy. Consequently, at times,
the central bank deliberately allows inflation to deviate from the inflation target to
ensure that it does not introduce unnecessary volatility in the real economy or on
financial markets (Svensson 1997; Woodford. 2003). Second, inflation stability is the
central bank’s main target. However, the bank also has an important role to play in
stabilizing the business cycle and acting as a lender of last resort duringmajor financial
crises (Goodhart 2011). At times, the central bank has to limit its focus on inflation to
address other important problems in the economy.
All inflation targeting central banks have what is called flexible inflation targets.
In the long-run they focus entirely on inflation, but in the short-run, they may allow
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inflation to temporarily deviate from the target for various reasons as long as it does
not jeopardize the inflation target in the long run. How flexible the target should be is
an important policy question. In theory, the behavior of the central bank should reflect
the preferences of the public. In practice, it is often left to the central bank to decide
how to implement the inflation target.
Sometimes the law offers some guidance to the central bank on how flexible their
policy is allowed to be. For example, article 127 in theLisbon treaty setting out the aims
of the European Central Bank (ECB) states: ‘The primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as “the ESCB”) shall be to maintain
price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall
support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on
European Union” (Lisbon Treaty, article 127). The ECBmay consider other variables,
but only if the bank satisfies the price stability target, i.e., the inflation target. In the
Euro area, the scope for inflation to deviate from the target is limited, and inflation
should return to the target relatively quickly.
In contrast, in the United States, the goal is to ‘maintain long-run growth of the
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long-run potential
to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employ-
ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates; (Federal Reserve 2018)1’.
Although inflation should be mean-reverting to the target, deviations could be longer
given the wider mandate. The wider mandate is potentially once reason the Federal
Reserve was one of the last major central banks to publically announce an official
inflation target.
Allowing the central bank to have a flexible policy raises the questions of how
flexible should the policy be andhowflexible is the present policy? In such a discussion,
a measure of the degree of flexibility of the policy is needed. Currently, there is no
simple measure of how flexible the inflation target is.
2.2 Estimating the Degree of Flexibility
There is no generally agreed-upon method to estimate the flexibility of an inflation
target. One common approach is to do so indirectly, by modeling the central bank’s
interest-setting policy. According to the Taylor rule, an inflation-targeting central bank
with a strict inflation target sets the interest rate solely as a function of the degree
to which inflation deviates from the target. Central banks with flexible targets also
take other variables into account, such as growth, unemployment, asset prices, and
credit growth. An estimate of flexibility is thus obtained by regressing the central
bank’s policy rate on a set of variables and determining whether any variable beyond
inflation systematically affects the central bank’s interest rate policy (see, e.g., Clarida
et al. 1998; Cobion and Goldstein 2012). This indirect approach is sensitive to which
variables are included in the analysis. Omitting an important variable may bias the
results and produce misleading conclusions.
1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/Sect.2a.htm.
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Analternative, direct approach tomeasuring the flexibility is to study the persistence
of the inflation process. Strict inflation targeting implies that deviations from the target
are small and brief. Flexible inflation targeting, on the other hand, implies that inflation
may deviate from the target for long periods of time. An estimate of the inflation
target’s flexibility is obtained by estimating the persistence of the inflation process.
This approach does not require determining which variables to include in the analysis.
Rather, it is based solely on studying the inflation process itself.
One method of measuring the degree of flexibility is to study the persistence of
inflation using an ARFIMA model. Assume in accordance with theory that (i) long-
run inflation is caused by the central bank’s monetary policy, and (ii) over the short-
to medium-run, inflation is affected by external factors, such as the business cycle
and energy prices, that the central bank may or may not wish to neutralize to stabilize
inflation. Under these assumptions, the long-run persistence in inflation is determined
by the central bank’s monetary policy. The higher the long run persistence, the more
flexible is the inflation target.
In the ARFIMA model, there are 3 sets of parameters: the MA parameters capture
the persistence of the external shocks affecting inflation. The AR parameters capture
the short- to medium-run persistence in inflation. The fractional integration order
captures the long-run persistence in inflation. In accordance with theory, we assume
that long run inflation is determined by monetary policy. The fractional integration
order is thus an estimate of how flexible the central bank has chosen the inflation
target to be. A higher integration order implies that the central bank allows inflation
to deviate from the inflation target for a longer period of time, and the inflation target
is thus flexible. A lower integration order implies that inflation returns to the inflation
target relatively quickly, and the inflation target is thus flexible.
The AR-parameters measures the short- to medium-run persistence of inflation.
These parameters are both a measure of the central banks willingness to neutralize
external shocks affecting inflation and how successful they are in neutralizing them.
The AR parameters are not an estimate of how flexible the inflation target is since the
central bank does not perfectly control inflation over the short- to medium-term.
By estimating an ARFRIMA model, we can obtain an estimate of the long-run
persistence in inflation and thus the central bank’s willingness to allow inflation to
deviate from the inflation target. This approach is a simple technique to complement
already existing methods to estimate how flexible the inflation targets are.
3 State SpaceMaximum Likelihood Estimator of the Fractional
Difference Parameter
Consider the ARFIMA (p,d,q) process y  {yt , t  1, . . . , n }, which is defined by:
Φ(B)(1 − B)d yt  Θ(B)εt , (2.1)
where 0 < d < 1, εt ∼ i .i .d.N (0, σ 2ε ); B is the backward difference operator Byt 
yt−1; whileΦ(B)  1−φ1B− . . .−φpB p andΘ(B)  1−θ1B− . . .−θq Bq . When
p and q are less than or equal to 1, we can obtain a truncated AR or MA representation
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of the ARFIMA (p,d,q) model, and estimate the parameters by approximate MLE.
It is difficult to write out closed-form AR or MA representations and carry out the
estimation when p and q exceed 1. However, we can use Hosking’s (1981) method
and estimate the parameters in the ARFIMA model recursively:
Step 1 Estimate d0 by viewing yt as a pure fractional difference series and then
applying the ARIMA (p,0,q) process u0t  (1 − B)d0 yt ;
Step 2Use the Box-Jenkins method to identify and estimateΦ0 andΘ0 parameters
in the ARIMA (p,0,q) model Φ(B)u0t  Θ(B)εt ;
Step 3 Apply the ARIMA (0, d, 0) process x0t  {Θ0(B)}−1Φ0(B)yt , and estimate
d 1 in the fractional difference process (1 − B)d1xt  εt ;
Step 4 Check for convergence with the convergence rule d i − d i−1 < 0.005, and
obtain the estimation results d i , Φ i and Θ i .
The most essential step in this procedure is to estimate parameter d in the fractional
difference process. The literature of the estimator for d is comprehensive, and several
methods have been proposed. Chan and Palma (1998) established a theoretical founda-
tion for estimating the ARFIMAmodel in the framework of a state space model based
on the approximate MLE. The authors mention that although the ARFIMAmodel has
infinite AR orMA state-space-model representation, the exact likelihood function can
be computed recursively in finite steps by applying the Kalman filter. To estimate the
fractional difference parameters, the authors truncate the infinite AR or MA repre-
sentations into finite lags and calculate the approximate maximum likelihood. Chan
and Palma (1998) show that the state space model estimator based on approximate
maximum likelihood has desirable asymptotic properties as well as a rapid converging
rate.
Recently, Grassi and Magistris (2014) carried out a simulation study to compare
the state space model-based long memory estimation with some of the widely applied
parametric and semi-parametric methods. They show that, compared to the other esti-
mations, the method proposed by Chan and Palma (1998) is robust to the t distribution,
missing value, measurement error, and level shift. However, both Chan and Palma
(1998) and Grassi and Magistris (2014) concentrate mainly on estimating d in a sta-
tionary time series when 0 < d < 0.4, or no estimation of greater magnitude of σ 2ε
rather than unit variance is provided. We have thus extended the estimation to a wider
range of combinations, where d ∈ (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, 0.48, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98)
and σε ∈ (1, 3, 5) in the framework of the state space model. Two different estimation
methods were applied: the first was based on MLE, and the second was our Bayesian
MCMC method. We compared how the estimation methodologies perform when the
series are divided into 4 categories: pure stationary with d ∈ (0.2, 0.3, 0.4); nearly
non-stationary with d ∈ (0.45, 0.48); pure non-stationary with d ∈ (0.7, 0.8, 0.9);
nearly unit root with d ∈ (0.95, 0.98). Due to its overall superior performance, the
Bayesian MCMC method will be used in later empirical analysis.
To obtain the state space form representation for the long memory series (1 −
B)d yt  εt with εt ∼ i .i .d.N (0, σ 2ε ), Chan and Palma (1998) suggest writing the
model in the form of truncated AR orMA expansions: yt  ∑mj1 π j yt− j +εt or yt ∑m
j0 ψ jεt− j , where m is truncated lag length. The AR coefficients are given by
π j  Γ ( j−d)Γ ( j+1)Γ (−d) and MA coefficients are given by ψ j  Γ ( j+d)Γ ( j+1)Γ (d) , where Γ
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denoting the Gamma function. This paper use AR expansion where π j  −( j−d−1)!j!(−d−1)! ,
and the state space form representation can be expressed as:
{
yt  Zαt (Measurement equation)
αt+1  Tαt + Hεt (State equation) (2.2)



































π1 . . . πm
Im−1 . . . 0
)
m∗m
where Im−1 is iden-
tity matrix. Based on the truncated state space form representation, we can obtain the
approximate likelihood function with the corresponding estimation algorithm order
O(n). Compared with order O(n3) in exact MLE, the reduced computation order
achieves a more efficient estimation and faster computation time (Chan and Palma
1998).
The Kalman filter is thereafter utilized to calculate the approximate likelihood
function and we give a very brief presentation of the estimation process here. Let
It−1  {y1, y2, . . . , yt−1} denote the information set at t − 1. m ∗ 1 vector α̃t−1 and
m ∗ m matrix are defined as follows:
α̃t−1  E[αt−1|It−1 ], (2.3)
Pt−1  Var [αt−1|It−1 ], (2.4)
Based on the state equation in (2), the optimal predictor for αt , based on information
at t−1, isαt |t−1  T α̃t−1,while the optimal predictor for Pt is Pt |t−1  T Pt−1T ′+Q,
where Q  Var(Hεt )  HVar(εt )H ′ 
(
σ 2ε . . . 0
0 . . . 0
)
m∗m
Based on the measurement
equation in (2.2), the corresponding optimal predictor for yt is yt |t−1  Zαt |t−1 . Once
the new observation yt is available, we can get prediction error νt  yt − yt |t−1 
yt − Zαt |t−1 . The expectation vector in (2.3) and variance matrix in (2.4) can also be
updated as:
α̃t  αt |t−1 + Pt |t−1 Z ′F−1t νt , (2.5)
Pt  Pt |t−1 − Pt |t−1 Z ′F−1t Z Pt |t−1 , (2.6)
where Ft is the variance of νt with Ft  E(νtν′t )  Z Pt |t−1 Z ′, and we can further
update αt+1|t  T α̃t , Pt+1|t  T PtT ′ + Q. Thus, when the initial values α̃0 and P0
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are specified, the Kalman filter will return a sequence of prediction errors νt , and the
variance Ft , t  1, . . . , n. Finally, by maximizing the log likelihood function
ln L( y|θ )  −n
2











the parameters θ  (d, σ 2ε ) can be estimated. More detailed procedure of estimation
can refer to Chan and Palma (1998), Grassi and Magistris (2014), and Tusell (2011).
However, Chan and Palma (1998) as well as Grassi andMagistris (2014) considered
only stationary series with 0 < d < 0.4 where σ 2ε  1 and is assumed to be known.
The range of integration orders considered in their simulations is relatively narrow
from an economic point of view. Several economic time series, such as exchange rates
(Andersson 2014), inflation (Hassler and Wolters 1995; Caggiano and Castelnuovo
2011), and interest rates (Tkacz 2001); Coelman and Sirichand 2012) have been found
to be covariance non-stationary yet mean-reverting. We have thus expanded the sim-
ulations (see Tables 1, 2 and 3) to also include nearly non-stationary where d ∈ (0.45,
0.48), non-stationary though mean-reverting where d ∈ (0.7, 0.8, 0.9), and nearly unit
root where d ∈ (0.95, 0.98) time series. Unlike Chan and Palma (1998) and Grassi
and Magistris (2014) we also consider both situations where σ 2ε is known (Table 1),
and when σ 2ε is unknown and estimated jointly with d (Table 2). In the simulation, the
initial value of α̃0 is set to 0, and P0 is the empirical auto-covariance matrix up to lag
m, which is set to 10. We concentrated on the case where n  170, which corresponds
to the sample size in our empirical analysis. The standard deviation of the shocks is
set to σε ∈ (1, 3, 5). The simulation is based on 500 repetitions.
The estimates of the integration order are unbiased for all cases except where d
is close to 0.5 and the estimates contain a positive bias. The bias is relatively large
(between 0.10 and 0.12). In an empirical analysis, this bias increases the risk of con-
cluding that a series is non-stationary when it is actually stationary.
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the bias is independent of whether σ 2ε is known or
unknown and of the value of σ 2ε . Estimates of σ
2
ε are unbiased irrespective of d (see
Table 1 Estimation of d based on the state space model when σε is known
d 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias 0.001 0.014 0.044 0.079 0.124 0.033 0.014 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.011
RMSE 0.076 0.070 0.090 0.124 0.167 0.079 0.069 0.059 0.056 0.060
σ  3
Bias 0.001 0.010 0.041 0.081 0.131 0.027 0.018 0.002 − 0.004 − 0.008
RMSE 0.066 0.067 0.093 0.125 0.172 0.077 0.071 0.062 0.059 0.061
σ  5
Bias − 0.003 0.017 0.048 0.077 0.134 0.025 0.018 0.003 − 0.004 − 0.005
RMSE 0.065 0.075 0.099 0.121 0.171 0.076 0.074 0.062 0.056 0.058
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Table 2 Estimation of d based on the state space model when σε is unknown
d 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias − 0.001 0.017 0.043 0.079 0.125 0.029 0.014 0.004 − 0.005 − 0.009
RMSE 0.077 0.069 0.096 0.121 0.166 0.079 0.065 0.064 0.058 0.057
σ  3
Bias 0.006 0.020 0.041 0.084 0.112 0.030 0.011 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.007
RMSE 0.077 0.064 0.088 0.123 0.155 0.081 0.067 0.061 0.058 0.058
σ  5
Bias 0.002 0.015 0.041 0.067 0.121 0.036 0.016 0.001 − 0.008 − 0.009
RMSE 0.056 0.066 0.089 0.100 0.170 0.078 0.070 0.060 0.049 0.050
Table 3 Estimation of σε based on the state space model
d 0.20 0.30 0.04 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias − 0.001 − 0.001 0.004 0.015 0.025 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.004 − 0.005 0.006
RMSE 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.059 0.064 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.052 0.055
σ  3
Bias − 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.041 0.062 0.010 − 0.006 0.011 − 0.003 − 0.013
RMSE 0.166 0.155 0.167 0.181 0.180 0.153 0.152 0.132 0.135 0.150
σ  5
Bias − 0.010 − 0.016 0.019 0.065 0.142 0.002 − 0.015 − 0.008 − 0.037 − 0.038
RMSE 0.227 0.234 0.224 0.255 0.314 0.221 0.208 0.225 0.266 0.228
Table 3), and only the estimates of d are biased for the series with an integration order
close to 0.5.
Generally speaking, the state space model-based estimation yields satisfactory
results in most cases. The only exception occurs in the nearly non-stationary situ-
ation, when d ∈ (0.7, 0.8, 0.9), and the serious over-bias causes the estimated series
to become non-stationary. The over-bias will continue to be a problem if we have no
prior information about the series. However, in certain situations, we have some prior
knowledge as to whether the series is stationary or not. In that case, it is worthwhile
to guarantee that the estimation of d lies in the correct ranges. It is natural to apply
the Bayesian approach to incorporate the prior information into the estimation. In the
next section, we combine the state-space representation with the Bayesian approach
to make further comparisons.
4 BayesianMCMC Estimator
The estimation in Sect. 2 is based on the maximization of the log-likelihood function
ln L( y|θ)  − n2 ln(2π ) − 12
{∑n






, where θ is assumed to
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be fixed but unknown. When prior information indicates whether or not the series is
stationary, we can use this knowledge by setting d as a random variable with its domain
defined separately as 0 < d < 0.5 or0.5 < d <1. This paper combines the Bayesian
inferencewith the state-spacemodel to estimate θ . Instead of estimating the parameters
by maximizing the log-likelihood function ln L(y|θ ), we first construct the posterior
distribution L(θ |y) based on the prior distributionπ (θ ) and the approximate likelihood
function L(y|θ ) by L(θ |y)∞L(y|θ )π (θ ). The MCMC algorithm is implemented to
generate values directly from the L(θ |y), and the estimator for the parameters is the
expected value from the posterior distribution.
The prior information π (θ ) is chosen as the independent prior information for d and
σε with π (θ )  π (d)π (σ ). In cases where we already know that the series is stationary
with 0 < d < 0.5 and non-stationary with 0.5 < d <1, we chose the uniform distributions
Unif (0,0.5) and Unif (0.5,1), respectively, for d. The prior distribution σε does not
depend on d, and this paper uses Unif (0,10). Then, the posterior distributions for d
and σε are:


























The estimators for d and σε are simply the posterior mean, and σ̂ 
∫
σ dP(σ |y) .
As the marginal posterior P(d|y) and P(σ |y) cause the integration to be analytically
intractable, we utilized the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate samples from
the posterior distribution and then took the mean value of the samples as the posterior
mean. Furthermore, since the posterior distributions for d and σε depend conditionally
on one another, a 2-step iterative Metropolis-Hastings method was applied as follows:
Step 1 Set initial values for d and σε with d0 and σ 0ε .
Step 2 Generate d ∗ from Unif (0, 0.5) for stationary series and Unif (0.5,1) for
non-stationary series.
Fori  1, 2 . . .








, take u from Unif (0,1), if u < αd set
d i  d ∗; otherwise set d i  d i−1.
Step 4 Generate σ ∗ε from Unif (0,10).






p(σ i−1|di ,y )
}
, take u from Unif (0,1), if u < ασ set
σ iε  σ ∗ε ; otherwise set σ iε  σ i−1ε .
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In this algorithm, Steps 3 and 5 guarantee that the new proposed values d ∗ and σ ∗ε
are accepted with acceptance probabilities αd and ασ . This procedure is the necessary
condition in order for d i and σ iε to converge to the posterior distribution. For a theo-
retical discussion of MCMC and Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, see Scollnik (1996),
Brooks (1998), and Besag (2004).
We set d0  0.25 for stationary series, d0  0.75 for non-stationary series, and
σ 0ε  sd(y). N is set at 300, and N0 is set at 50, because the simulation result shows
both di and σ iε converging to stability at a very fast rate. If the other initial values are
chosen, the estimation results are similar. The new estimation is shown in Tables 4, 5,
and 6:
Tables 4 and 5 show that the MCMC-based method produces almost exactly the
same result when d ∈(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98), but makes much better
estimations when d ∈(0.4, 0.45, 0.48), meaning that when prior information is avail-
able, the Bayesian-based method can greatly improve the estimation. Table 6 shows
that the estimation of σε is more over-biased than Table 3 when d  0.48; this is
because we chose the prior distribution for σε with a much larger range ofUnif (0,10).
This is consistent with the extreme importance of choosing the correct prior distribu-
Table 4 Estimation of d based on the MCMC when σε is known
d 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias 0.012 0.020 0.018 0.003 − 0.006 0.037 0.018 − 0.007 − 0.024 − 0.037
RMSE 0.061 0.067 0.054 0.042 0.031 0.079 0.067 0.054 0.050 0.051
σ  3
Bias 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.005 − 0.006 0.035 0.024 − 0.006 − 0.020 − 0.036
RMSE 0.060 0.067 0.055 0.039 0.032 0.077 0.070 0.050 0.046 0.053
σ  5
Bias 0.008 0.011 0.018 0.003 − 0.004 0.039 0.023 − 0.003 − 0.024 − 0.039
RMSE 0.065 0.064 0.055 0.040 0.026 0.081 0.066 0.052 0.048 0.053
Table 5 Estimation of d based on the MCMC when σε is unknown
d 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias 0.010 0.019 0.019 0.003 − 0.007 0.035 0.016 0.001 − 0.024 − 0.039
RMSE 0.066 0.062 0.057 0.042 0.031 0.80 0.067 0.047 0.046 0.052
σ  3
Bias 0.009 0.018 0.016 0.005 − 0.004 0.033 0.023 − 0.001 − 0.020 − 0.038
RMSE 0.063 0.067 0.055 0.037 0.030 0.077 0.067 0.051 0.045 0.059
σ  5
Bias 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.005 − 0.004 0.034 0.020 − 0.004 − 0.020 − 0.037
RMSE 0.050 0.068 0.056 0.038 0.027 0.079 0.069 0.051 0.048 0.050
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Table 6 Estimation of σε based on the MCMC
d 0.20 0.30 0.04 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.98
σ  1
Bias 0.007 0.009 0.025 0.042 0.101 0.018 0.019 0.011 − 0.009 0.004
RMSE 0.086 0.069 0.071 0.094 0.183 0.068 0.071 0.064 0.063 0.059
σ  3
Bias 0.022 0.035 0.060 0.120 0.350 0.044 0.030 0.018 0.017 0.019
RMSE 0.160 0.162 0.164 0.200 0.500 0.165 0.150 0.170 0.150 0.165
σ  5
Bias 0.020 0.061 0.078 0.190 0.557 0.052 0.038 0.037 0.024 0.023
RMSE 0.27 0.230 0.260 0.400 0.092 0.290 0.244 0.269 0.235 0.228
tion in Bayesian inference. However, compared with the improved estimation when d
∈(0.4, 0.45, 0.48), the bias of σ̂ε is acceptable.
Clearly, the Bayesian MCMC estimator attains superior performance compared to
theMLE in Sect. 2; thus, the 6-step estimation process described in Sect. 3was adopted
to estimate the fractional difference parameter in the following empirical analysis.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Countries and Data
We tested the flexibility of inflation targets in 7 developed and inflation-targeting
economies: Canada, the Euro area, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The sample period begins in January 1993 and ends in October
2017. Germany is included as a compliment to the euro area data since the euro was
first introduced in 1999. The European Central Bank is to a large extent modelled on
the German Bundesbank whereby we expect the results for Germany prior to 1999 to
closely follow the behavior of ECB post 1999.
Each economy’s inflation target is presented in Table 7. Canadawas the first country
to introduce an explicit target in 1991, followed by Sweden and the UnitedKingdom in
1993.2 The Euro area began to explicitly target inflation when the euro was introduced
in 1999. Norway followed in 2001, and the United States announced a formal target in
2012. Although Norway, the Germany/Euro area and the United States formally began
to target inflation after our sample begins in 1993, at least Germany and the United
states had implicit inflation targets prior to this time (Svensson 1998; Gerberding
et al. 2004; Lindsey et al. 2005). Whether having an implicit or explicit inflation target
affects the results is one issue we will consider in our analysis.
2 Both Sweden and the United Kingdom have updated their inflation target since 1993. For example, both
countries have changed the price index used to estimate inflation. However, these changes are minor and
are not expected to affect our results.
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics




Inflation target 2% <2% Approximately 2.5% 2% 2% 2%
±1 pp ±1 pp
Inflation
measure
CPI HICP CPI CPIF CPI PCE
Official target
announced
1991 1998 2001 1993 1993 2012
Average
1993–2017
1.8 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.8
SD 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Average
1999–2017
1.9 1.7 2.1 1.5 2.0 1.8
SD 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.9
We estimate the fractional integration order for three periods (i) the full sample
1993–2017, (ii) the period before the international financial crisis 1993–2006; (iii)
the period after the introduction of the euro (1999–2017). By splitting the sample
into sub-samples allows us to consider two important questions. First, whether having
an implicit or explicit inflation target affects the results.3 And second, whether the
financial crisis and its aftermath has affected the behavior of central banks. The crisis
and its real economic consequences may have shifted central banks attention from
inflation targeting to stabilizing the financial system and the real economy whereby
we expect the inflation targets to have become more flexible after 2007/09.
Almost all countries have chosen inflation targets of 2%; Norway is an outlier,
with a target rate of 2.5%. Some economies’ inflation targets include a tolerance band
showing the range within which inflation is allowed to or likely to deviate from the
target due to factors outside the central bank’s control (for a discussion see Hammond
2012; Andersson and Jonung 2017). Tolerance bands are often announced to allow the
central bank to consider other non-inflation events in the economy while maintaining
credibility for its inflation target. Consequently, we may expect the integration order
to be higher for countries with tolerance bands.
Inflation is always measured using an estimate of consumer price inflation. The
exact construction of the indexvaries across countries. Somecountries use their domes-
tic Consumer Price Index (CPI); Sweden uses the CPI but with a fixed mortgage rate
(CPIF), the United States relies on the price index for Personal Consumption Expen-
ditures (PCE), and the Euro area uses the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP). Average inflation for the full sample was between 1.7% (Sweden) and 2.1%
(Norway). In other words, average inflation was close to the numerical targets. For
the shorter 1999–2017 sample, average inflation was between 1.5% (Sweden) and
3 The sample period is unfortunately too short to test if the Federal Reserve’s behaviour has changed post
2012 when it began to formally target inflation. Instead we rely on comparing the results across countries
to determine whether there is a difference between implicit and explicit inflation targets.
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Euro Area United Kingdom United States Germany
Fig. 1 Inflation in the Euro area, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, January 1993 to
September 2017
2.1% (Norway). On average, inflation is close to the targets’ respective central values.
For most economies, inflation is slightly below the target, between − 0.4 (Norway)
and − 0.2 percentage points (United States) for the full sample, and between − 0.4
(Norway) and − 0.1 percentage points (Canada) for the shorter sample. The excep-
tion is the United Kingdom, where average inflation is exactly equal to the central
value. All deviations from the central value are small and within the tolerance band
for those countries with explicit bands. Moreover, inflation estimates are subject to
measurement error, whereby we cannot rule out that inflation is actually equal to the
target.
While average inflation is close to the targets, there have been relatively large fluc-
tuations in inflation. Inflation for the 3 largest economies (Euro area, United Kingdom
and the United States) is shown in Fig. 1. Figure 2 illustrates inflation for the 3 minor
economies (Canada, Norway, and Sweden). Inflation fluctuates within the range of −
2% to 6%. It appears to be more volatile in the smaller economies; however, judg-
ing from the figures, the deviations from the mean are more persistent in the larger
economies. The long persistence in the inflation process is particularly noticeable for
the United Kingdom, where inflation trended downward from 1993 and 1999 before
it began to trend upward for the next 8 years, rising above 5% in 2008. Following
the financial crisis, inflation in the United Kingdom has fluctuated in shorter cycles
of 3 to 4 years. In contrast, the persistence of inflation in Sweden is much shorter
compared to the larger economies. Inflation in Canada and Norway also displays less
persistence. The figures indicate that inflation among the smaller economies is likely
to have a smaller integration order compared to the larger economies.
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Fig. 2 Inflation in Canada, Norway, and Sweden, January 1993 to September 2017
The larger economies were all directly affected by the financial crisis of 2007–09,
which is visible in the figure by large drops in inflation in 2008–09. The smaller
economies were not directly affected by the crisis by having a banking crisis them-
selves, but were indirectly affected as the crisis spread across the world. In these
countries, inflation was more stable than in the larger economies through the end of
the 2000s. Inflation in the 2010s has shown relatively large fluctuations, indicating that
central banks have potentially focused less on inflation targets and more on financial
stability and economic recovery after the crisis.
5.2 Estimation Results
To estimate the ARFIMA model, we followed the 4-step process outlined in Sect. 2,
which was proposed by Hoskings (1981).When we estimated the fractional difference
parameters in the process, we applied our 6-stepMCMCmethod in Sect. 3. Estimation
results of the ARFIMAmodel for the large economies are shown in Table 8, and for the
small economies in Table 9. The results confirm that inflation is a persistent process
characterized by relatively long swings away from the mean. The fractional integra-
tion order is significantly larger than 0 for all economies. In addition, the fractional
integration order is larger than 0.5, indicating that inflation is a variance–covariance
non-stationary, yet still mean-reverting process. In other words, inflation exhibits long
swings around its mean.
Reviewing the full sample period from 1993–2017, Sweden and the United King-
dom stand out compared to the other countries. For most economies, the fractional
integration order was within the interval 0.74 (Germany) and 0.83 (Canada). Swe-
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Table 8 Estimation results: Euro area, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
Euro area Germany
1999–2017 1999–2006 1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017
d 0.97 (0.03) 0.98 (0.05) 0.74 (0.02) 0.71 (0.03) 0.85 (0.03)
σε 0.26 (0.01) 0.21 (.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
AR(1) − 0.18 (0.18) 0.00 (0.13) 0.44 (0.10) 0.39 (0.11)
MA(1) 0.37 (.21) 0.19 (0.18) − 0.32 (0.10) − .39 (0.12)
United Kingdom United States
1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017 1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017
d 1.09 (0.03) 0.95 (0.03) 1.00 (0.04) 0.79 (0.03) 0.93 (0.03) 0.94 (0.03)
σε 0.26 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01)
AR(1) 0.47 (0.38) 0.60 (0.17) 0.67 (0.48) 0.41 (0.09) − 0.16 (0.16) − 0.06 (0.16)
MA(1) − 0.41 (0.39) − 0.66 (0.20) − 0.65 (0.48) 0.14 (0.10) 0.43 (0.15) 0.36 (0.16)
Table 9 Estimation results: Canada, Norway, and Sweden
Canada Norway
1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017 1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017
d 0.83 (0.03) 0.88 (0.04) 0.93 (0.04) 0.78 (0.03) 0.78 (0.04) 0.82 (0.04)
σε 0.41 (0.01) 0.42 (0.02) 0.43 (0.02) 0.45 (0.01) 0.44 (0.02) 0.43 (0.02)
AR(1) − 0.15 (0.23) − 0.32 (0.21) − 0.29 (0.22) 0.21 (0.15) 0.25 (0.19) 0.06 (.20)
MA(1) 0.42 (0.21) 0.61 (0.18) 0.44 (0.24) 0.22 (0.15) 0.16 (0.19) 0.32 (.19)
Sweden
1993–2017 1993–2006 1999–2017
d 0.59 (0.02) 0.36 (0.03) 0.89 (0.04)
σε 0.34 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01)
AR(1) 0.56 (0.07) 0.74 (.06) − 0.03 (0.32)
MA(1) − 0.13 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.03 (0.32)
den had a lower integration order of 0.59, and the United Kingdom’s was 1.09. In
other words, Sweden has a strict inflation target compared to the other countries and
the United Kingdom a very flexible target. For most economies, the persistence in
inflation was captured by the fractional integration order, but for Sweden the AR
parameter was also significant and relatively high at 0.56. This result is clear evidence
that Sweden has a stricter inflation target compared to the other countries.
We can draw two main conclusions from the Swedish and the United Kingdom
results. First, having a tolerance band does not automatically make the inflation target
more flexible. The Swedish inflation target included a tolerance band for most of the
sample period but the Swedish monetary policy is still the strictest. Second, both Swe-
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den and the United Kingdom have had explicit inflation targets throughout the sample
period. Still, they represent the countries with the smallest and highest integration
orders. In other words, there is no systematic evidence of the results being affected by
whether the central bank has an explicit or implicit inflation target.
The United Kingdom’s integration order of more than 1 suggests that British infla-
tion is a non-stationary process, i.e., the Bank of England has not stabilized inflation
around a stationary mean. This result is possibly explained by 1 of 3 factors: (i) the
swings away from the mean are very long, and the sample period too short to capture
the mean-reversion of the inflation series; (ii) the financial crisis in 2008–09 caused
the bank to deviate from its inflation target to focusing on stabilizing the economy;
or (iii) there is a break in the mean, which may bias the estimate of the fractional
integration order. Figure 1 lends some support to factors 1 and 3. United Kingdom
inflation is characterized by persistent trends from 1993 to 2008. First, inflation was
on a downward trajectory—from 3 to 0.5%—from 1993 to 1999. Thereafter, it trended
upward, reaching 5% in 2008. Following the crisis, inflation fluctuated substantially,
falling to 1% in 2009 before again reaching 5% in 2012, then falling to 0% in 2016
before increasing to 3% in 2017. The financial crisis has clearly affected inflation,
indicating a change of focus from central banks. A break in the mean may bias any
estimate of the integration order (see, e.g., Narayan and Narayan 2010). However,
average United Kingdom inflation is stable over time (see Table 7), which makes the
third explanation less likely.
All 3 major economies were clearly affected by the financial crisis, which may
affect how central banks conduct monetary policy. To test this hypothesis, we re-
estimated the model from 1993 to 2006, the year before the financial crisis began.
Excluding the years after the crisis reduced the fractional integration order for the
United Kingdom from 1.09 to 0.95. The fractional integration order was relatively
high, but remained below 1, indicating mean-reversion. The fractional integration
order for the United States was similar at 0.93, which is higher compared to the full
sample period. Interestingly, the United Kingdom and the United States have almost
the same integration order despite the Federal Reserve having an implicit inflation
target and the Bank of England an explicit inflation target throughout this time period.
Again, the results point to having explicit or implicit inflation targets does not affect
the results. The fractional integration order of the German inflation rate remains stable
over time (between 0.71 and 0.74).
For the three smaller economies that were only indirectly affected by the finan-
cial crisis, the results were similar to those for the full sample period. The fractional
integration order for Sweden was smaller compared to the other countries, while the
AR parameter was larger, indicating a relatively strict implementation of the infla-
tion target. For Canada and Norway, the inflation targets were more flexible, and the
integration order was higher; however, the results still clearly point toward a mean-
reverting processes. The estimated fractional integration order was 0.88 for Canada
and 0.78 for Norway. Similar to Germany, the estimated integration order for Norway
is similar irrespective of sample period despite the Bank of Norway having shifted
from an implicit to an explicit inflation target in 2001.
Next, we re-estimated the model for the period 1999–2017, which allowed us to
include the Euro area in the analysis. We only considered the full-time period in this
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case, as restricting the sample to the 1999–2006 period would leave us with too few
time observations to capture inflation’s long-run properties. The pattern of the results
remained similar to the previous results: (i) inflation is a mean-reverting process,
yet with long swings; (ii) larger economies tend to have a higher integration order
compared to smaller countries, and (iii) having an explicit or implicit inflation target
does not appear to impact the results. In this sample the estimated integration orders
were 0.97 for the Euro, area 1.00 for the United Kingdom, and the United States it
was 0.94. For the smaller countries, the corresponding estimates were Canada 0.93,
Norway 0.82, and Sweden 0.89.
One change in the results when excluding the early parts of the 1990 s is that the
estimated fractional integration order increased for all small countries. The increase
was particularly large for Sweden, where the integration order increased from 0.59
to close to 0.89. Judging from Fig. 2, the swings in inflation became longer after the
financial crisis, especially in comparison to the 1990s. The increased integration order
indicates a change in policy focus from a stricter inflation-targeting perspective in
the 1990s to a more flexible approach, especially after the financial crisis. Smaller
countries adopted inflation targets in the 1990s following 2 decades of relatively high
inflation. It is possible that a strict focus on inflation targeting in the early years was
necessary to build confidence for the target, while over time, central banks have gained
sufficient public confidence for the target to consider more than inflation whenmaking
interest rate decisions. It is also possible that the shift in focus was forced upon the
central banks by the financial crisis, after which they needed to take action to stabilize
both the real economy and the financial system at the expense of the inflation target.
6 Conclusions
This paper answers the question ‘Are central bankers inflation nutters?’ by testing
the flexibility of inflation targets. We define flexibility based on the persistence of
inflation. A higher degree of persistence implies that inflation deviates from the mean
for a longer period of time, and the inflation target is thus flexible. A lower degree
of persistence implies that the deviations from the mean do not last very long and
that the inflation target is flexible. Persistence is modeled using an ARFIMA model.
To estimate the fractional difference parameter in the ARFIMA model, we applied
the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm in MCMC, as this method can achieve the same
precise estimation as the approximate maximum likelihood method while resolving
the problem of over-bias when 0.4 < d < 0.5.
The empirical results show that inflation is a mean-reverting process, but that devia-
tions from themean are persistent. This persistence, judgedby the fractional integration
order, is higher among larger economies than among smaller ones. The financial crisis
of 2008–09 likely caused central banks to shift focus from relatively strict inflation
targeting to a more flexible approach. We find no evidence of central banks having
implicit inflation targets being more flexible compared to countries with an explicit
target.
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